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Introduction: From Artemis temple at Ephesus to
Bamiyan
In 1840, La Revue des Deux Mondes published an amazing and satirical poem titled Érostrate
au temple d’Ephèse.1 Written by the then well-known poet Auguste Barbier (1805-1882), it
was meant, according to a contemporary critic, to ‘castigate the ambitious mediocrity
that stops at nothing even at crime, when ambition and celebrity are at stake’.2 My idea is
precisely to start with the famous iconoclast Erostrate and with the destruction of the
Temple  of  Artemis  at  Ephesus  in  356  BC as  a  paradigmatic  way  to  speak  about  the
destruction of the Buddhas in Bamiyan (Afghanistan), some 2,357 years later.3
Barbier does not put the monument itself at the centre of the poem, but he definitely
hints at the very person of the iconoclast, fascinated by the sacrilege and the outrage he
was to commit, a sacrilege that future generations will recall tirelessly. In the poem, the
outrage consists first in an offence to the deities, or rather to personified abstractions,
such as Piety and Beauty. It is also, according to the poem, an insult to the whole of
mankind. Erostrate himself described his monstrous act as a sacrifice to the ‘consuming
Death’, also a personified entity. Speaking of the sacrifice he was offering, the iconoclast
declared: ‘it is more than hundred bulls with golden horns’; it was meant to escape the
sense of annihilation that oblivion brings about. Yet, the victim of the sacrifice was not
clearly  referred  to:  it  could  be  the  monument  itself,  burned  down  by  Erostrate,  or
Erostrate himself. The ones offended by this act of iconoclasm, beyond the temple and its
deity, are not clearly discernible either: the deified Beauty or ‘ignorant peoples’? ‘false
pontiffs’? ‘the city’?, to quote the very words of Barbier.
The case of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, whose destruction was ordered by the Taliban in
2001,  shows  intriguing  similarities  with  the  destruction  of  Artemis  Temple:  the
eradication of a monument, sacred as well as emblematic and belonging to the cultural
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heritage, an attack against the Piety and the Beauty, a religious offence and an outrage to
an art monument; in other words a sacrifice in all its ambiguous meanings. A similar
uncertainty characterizes as well  the identification of the victims: are they people in
general,  abstract  deities,  specific  communities?  Are  they  Buddhists  in  South  and
Southeast  Asia?  Inhabitants  of  central  Afghanistan? Or  virtual  communities,  such  as
western art lovers? International Organisations (UNESCO, etc.)? Or is the whole humanity
the real victim? It is far from evident as will be discussed in this article.
The  2001  destruction in  Bamiyan is,  by  far,  the  most  spectacular  attack  against  the
historical and cultural heritage of Afghanistan ever committed during the recent period
of turmoil the country has passed through—a period that began with the Communist
Coup of April 1978 and is still not over. It is also unique for the worldwide mobilisation it
aroused, though it is, alas, not the only damage inflicted to archaeological remains in
Afghanistan.  If,  at  least  intentionally,  the  Communists  did  not  destroy  any  religious
monuments when in power in Kabul, it remains that, unfortunately, the old city of Herat
and the neighbouring monuments,  for instance,  suffered a lot from the fighting.  The
remaining minaret of the Gôwhar-Shâd Mosque, built during the Timurid period, was
almost entirely destroyed by the Russian artillery fire. Yet, the communist regime was
rather anxious to show, especially to the international community, its concern for the
preservation of the historical heritage. But nothing happened in Afghanistan which could
be  compared  to  the  revolutionary  iconoclasm  that  destroyed  Buddhist temples  and
images in Mongolia, Tibet and other places in Maoist China during the Great Cultural
Revolution, so as to take away their sacred aura and to prove that their religious or
magical power were non-existent.
But on the mujahidin side, the situation sharply differed. The Buddhist archaeological site
of Hadda (south-east of Afghanistan) was entirely devastated by some Islamic groups who
had been ‘pushed by the mullahs to destroy the pagan idols’ (Dupaigne 2007: 40). Nothing
remains today of this extraordinary site, of its sanctuaries, stupas and stucco figurines,
except perhaps for a few of them smuggled, now in Peshawar or elsewhere. A mosque
made in cement was even built in Hadda in 2002 at the very location of Mullah of Hadda’s
birth,  the ‘mad mullah’  who had called for  jihad against  the British in the late  19th
century.4 Though no Buddhists live in Afghanistan, what was at stake here—and very
much like what happened in Mongolia or in China—, was the eradication of objects or
monuments considered subjects of illusory beliefs and their replacement by the ‘True
Word’. This, somehow, foreshadowed the Taliban’s ‘puritan’ iconoclasm.
 
Mullah Omar’s decree
On 26 February, 2001, and after having consulted a college of ulema, Mullah Omar, the
leader of the Taliban, issued a decree ordering the elimination of all non-Islamic statues
and sanctuaries from Afghanistan. A kind of jihad was launched against the two Buddhas,
hewn into the cliff of Bamiyan. ‘Our soldiers are working hard; they are using all available
arms against the Buddhas’, said the Taliban’s spokesman.5 Rocket and tank shells were
brought into help, and the destruction was completed with dynamite. ‘It took us twenty
days;  it was  a  trying  work’,  he  insisted.  On  14  March,  the  Taliban  made  a  public
announcement to inform that the giant figures of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and the statues
kept in the Afghan National Museum in Kabul had all been destroyed.
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To the Muslim leaders of neighbouring countries, alarmed by the possible consequences
of such an inordinate action, the Mullah answered: ‘How could we justify, at the time of
the Last Judgement, having left these impurities on Afghan soil?’ (Lafrance 2001: 19). The
too long presence of the statues in a Muslim country was, according to him, a stain, a
major impurity that had to be gotten rid of. A twofold sacrifice was necessary: first, the
purifying sacrifice  of  the  statues  (decided by  the  26  February decree)  and then,  the
expiatory sacrifice of one hundred cows throughout the country, including twelve in the
former presidential palace (ordered on 15 March). In compliance with religious dictates,
the meat was to be given to the poor; a sacrifice that strangely echoes the ‘hundred bulls
with gilding horns’ mentioned in Auguste Barbier’s poem.
Yet, the victory over the Buddhas could only be won if there were witnesses. This is why
journalists, after witnessing the emptiness of the Kabul Museum, were flown to Bamiyan
on 26 March to see with their own eyes the gaping openness of the niches, deep into the
cliff, where the statues used to be. Prior to that, on the 19th March, the Taliban had agreed
for this one occasion only to let al-Jazira’s cameramen witness the final phase of the
sacrificial  explosion.  This footage was shown, again and again,  by many TV channels
worldwide, and reproduced as well as in several documentary films, for instance in The
Giant Buddhas, directed by Christian Frei.
Before its implementation, the Mullah’s decree provoked a worldwide mobilisation and
many attempts were made to convince the Taliban to call  off  their plans.  Indeed,  in
February and March 2001, a quasi-universal indignation built up, in Western countries
but also among ‘moderate’ Muslim clerics and chiefs of states outside Afghanistan. The
need to preserve a cultural heritage and to respect religious tolerance was at the core of
this general protest. For instance, in March 2001, The Centre Pompidou in Paris displayed
on its main front a gigantic photographic reproduction (40% of the original statue) made
from a 1887 etching. ‘The picture’, said the officials of the Centre, ‘is a sign of protest
against  fanaticism,  a  sign  of  resistance  to  the  rough  demonstration  of  hate  for
differences.’  Beside the procedures and steps taken by the UNESCO so as to save the
statues, the MET museum (New York), as well as some Buddhist states, such as Thailand,
Sri Lanka, and even Iran offered to ‘buy’ the Buddhas or to pay for its preservation. In
vain.
Such an outrage, such an extraordinary attack on religious and cultural emblems led
many to speculate about the hidden purposes of the Mullah. His argumentation and self-
justifications have been analysed endlessly.
 
Two types of analyses
Two categories of analyses, or of explanations, of the Mullah’s astounding decision are
possible. The first one, based on his and his close collaborators’ explicit argumentation,
highlights the Taliban clerics’ conception of the Muslim law. The other category, more
contextual  and  temporal,  takes  into  account  the  general  political  situation.  It  is
concerned with the position of the Taliban regime on the international scene. Though the
moderate  clerics  and  the  special  emissary  of  UNESCO  brought  the  theological
argumentation forward during their meeting with the Mullah’s representatives, most of
the commentators were convinced that the Mullah’s decree was rather linked to the
political context, to the progressive isolation of the Taliban.
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Contextual explanations are supported by the fact that the successive statements made
by the Taliban since they came to power were somewhat contradictory. In July 1999,
three years after the entry of the Mullah’s forces in Kabul, the Taliban minister of Culture
promulgated several directives insisting on the necessary protection of the antiquities
and other legacies of the past. He specifically mentioned the statues of Bamiyan, pointing
out that since the advent of Islam in Afghanistan, ‘they never suffered any damage’.6 The
minister spoke about the respect due to those antiquities and also mentioned the risk of
retaliation against mosques in Buddhist countries. He made it clear that, though they
were no Buddhist believers in Afghanistan, ‘Bamiyan would not be destroyed but, on the
contrary,  protected’  according to Luke Harding (2001).  In comparison, the famous 26
February decree appears as a real volte-face since it maintains that ‘these statues were
and are sanctuary for unbelievers. These unbelievers continue to worship and to venerate
these statues and pictures’.7
The UNESCO emissaries  pleaded in vain that  a  necessary distinction should be made
between idolatry and exemplarity, idol and icon, between admiration and worship. It is
not certain however that the Taliban made a difference between a secular admiration and
an idolatrous veneration. I will go back to this point later. Others, in particular Pierre
Lafrance (2001: 18), insisted on the exemplarity of piety, the ‘lesson of faith’, that these
statues could offer to the believers of all religions. In fact, the Taliban’s argumentation
gave no chance of success to the ambassadors of culture. ‘If the statues were objects of
cult for an Afghan minority, we would have to respect their belief and its objects; but we
don’t have a single Buddhist in Afghanistan’, said the Mullah, ‘so why preserve false [sic]
idols? And if they have no religious character, why get so upset? It is just a question of
breaking stones’ (Harding 2001). ‘But why breaking stones, if they are not objects of a
cult’, could have answered the emissary. For the Taliban and for others, could the giant
statues escape the Mullah’s dilemma: could they be something else than either idol or raw
stone?
Regarding the list  of  the outraged communities,  Pierre  Cambon,  chief-curator  of  the
Musée  Guimet  (Paris),  questioned  in  Pour  la  Science (2001:  25):  ‘Why  do  they  [the
destroyers of the Bamiyan Buddhas] take foreign populations hostage, populations such
as the people of India, of Greece, of Buddhist countries, for whom Bamiyan is, or was, the
symbols of their roots and traditions? (…) Yet, how to care for the Buddhas of Bamiyan,
leaving aside the general context?’ This question takes us back to the second category of
analyses and commentaries, which has to do with the external causes. According to most
commentators,  the burst  of  the crisis  had political  reasons,  not theological  ones;  the
latter being a screen for the former. The fate of the Buddhas was linked to the ostracism
forced upon the Taliban regime by the members  of  the UNO—with the exception of
Pakistan and some Arabian States.
A special  report written by Asia Soura in 2008—a resource of the Asia Society (2001)—
enumerates five factors, which may have contributed to the Mullah’s decision. The first is
related to the range of UN sanctions imposed in December 2000. The second and the third
factors are related to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and to the offer made by
western states (and, as we have seen, not only western) of substantial sums of money to
protect the Buddhas, when little attention was being given to the humanitarian crisis.
The fourth is the lack of reactions of the international community after Mullah Omar had
banned poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, and the fifth factor is the fact that the U.N. still
allowed the former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani to occupy the Afghanistan
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seat  at  the  U.N.,  while  the  Taliban’s  forces  controlled  90%  of  the  country.  Other
commentators mention a manipulation by radical elements, who wanted to make more
difficult any prospect of reconciliation between the Taliban and the West. Of course, a
combination of the above factors is to be taken in consideration.
It is to be noted however that Taliban officials, several times, reasserted that the Mullah’s
decree had ‘nothing to do with the regime’s craving for international recognition’, as put
by Mawlawi Quadratullah Jamal, Taliban minister of information and culture (Ahir 2001:
44).  He added that  ‘it  is  totally  an internal  religious  edict  that  has  been excessively
exaggerated in the outside world’ (Ahir 2001: 51), and had ‘been under consideration for
six years (Ahir 2001: 53),  but consequently, with the exception of ‘idolaters’,  targeted
states or institutions remain undesignated.  Nevertheless,  the non-explicit  factors and
reasons  have  more  weight,  for  the  commentators,  than  the  expressed  motives.  The
contextual factors seem to be more plausible than the theological arguments.
The humanitarian situation did trouble the western consciences. The Western World is in
reality exhibiting its arrogance and its egoism, when it seems to care exclusively about
salvaging the Buddhas and other antiquities, said, in substance, Paul Bernard, in Notre
Histoire (2001: n. 183). Bernard, who was the head of the DAFA (Délégation Archéologique
Française  en  Afghanistan/French  Archaeological  Delegation  in  Afghanistan)  between
1964 and 1980, adds: ‘The West would be ready to care for a few statues, but would remain
unconcerned about the misery of the Afghan people dying of hunger!’ The point was also
made by Pierre Cambon (2001: 12) who wrote: ‘It is dangerous to use the cultural heritage
as a stake in a time of troubles; it is difficult to protect it without first taking the human
needs into account.’ This comment is expressed again in Christian Frei’s documentary. He
quotes  the  Iranian  filmmaker  Mohsen  Makhmalbafi:  ‘I  am  now  convinced  that  the
Buddhist statues were not demolished. They crumbled to pieces out of shame, because of
the West’s indifference toward Afghanistan.’ These words are controversial; the West did
contribute, especially through The World Food Program, to the supplying of the Afghan
population in a much bigger scale than the neighbouring states and other Middle Eastern
powers.  The  argument  was,  as  we  have  seen,  used  several  times  and  with  different
nuances: the assault against the Buddhas was understood either as a reaction against the
state of abandonment in which the West had left Afghanistan or as a kind of reprisal
against the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and its refusal to recognise the
Taliban Emirate.
The Taliban themselves expressed, afterwards, their indignation and anger at the protest
coming from what they called the ‘Christian’ countries, exclusively concerned with saving
‘idols’ but ignorant of the ordeal endured by the Afghans. According to this point of view,
it is the Afghan cultural heritage that is, itself, the hostage. It is an indirect victim of the
Western countries’ double standard, moved by the destruction of statues but insensible to
the misery of the Afghan people. Mullah Omar and his followers actually tried to send us
back to our guilty conscience. Between the humanitarian values and the cultural values,
in the face of the theoretical choice between the Good and the Beautiful, the West had
made the  wrong choice!  Unfortunately,  the  destruction of  cultural  heritage  adds,  in
reality, and especially in Afghanistan, further to the misfortunes of the day.
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People, victims, and outraged communities
At first sight,  the elimination of the statues of Bamiyan directly affects the Buddhist
communities.  In  March 2001 already,  a  neo-Buddhist  intellectual,  Diwan Chand Ahir,
originating from the Indian Dalit community, published a well-informed booklet on the
destruction of the Buddhas, and on the reactions against it expressed in the Indian press.
This  destruction,  Ahir  wrote,  ‘(…)  shattered  the  sentiments  of  millions  of  Buddhist
followers’ (Ahir 2001: 57).8 Media and newspapers in Southeast Asian countries did react
strongly. They portrayed themselves as the spokespersons of an outraged community as
my wife and I noticed it when in Phnom Penh and Bangkok during these dramatic days of
March 2001. In these Buddhist countries, the shock was much more deeply felt than in
Europe and it is untrue that only an affluent West was moved at the news of the Buddhas’
destruction. Yet, the emotion was different. I remember a debate that appeared in The
Sunday Nation in Bangkok which, like Cambodge Soir, devoted whole pages to the fate of the
Buddhas: ‘The Buddha is not in his statues’, said some, ‘Only his teaching is important,
not  its  material  representations’.  ‘However’,  said  others,  ‘the  statues  of  the  Buddha
belong to our religious life; they are an essential aspect of the veneration of the Buddha,
as an historical as well as a sacred Person.’ ‘As objects of art and culture, they have a
material link with the teaching of the Buddha, who, ironically, finds the ultimate truth in
nothingness!’ concluded the newspaper.9
But, as said previously, for the Taliban and for many others, it is the Afghan people who
are the true victims, not of the iconoclasm, but of the affluent countries’ egoism. Even if
responsible for the blowing up, the Taliban think they are right in their posture of an
outraged group, outraged by the ‘provocation’ of these countries whose indignation and
offer to pay for the preservation of the two giant figures are, in the Taliban’s view, an
‘unexpected moral justification’, as put by Paul Bernard (2001:13).
Several shifts, or diversions, of indignation are noticeable in this display of reactions and
post-factum emotions.  ‘Instead of lamenting over idols’,  said the Taliban minister for
Information and Culture, ‘Muslim states should get indignant about the insults against
Islam’ (AIDH 2001). And the minister added: ‘Why didn’t those Muslim clerics go to India
when the Babri Mosque in Ayodha was demolished by Hindus [December 1992]?’ ‘Besides’,
he  went  on,  ‘Hindu  extremists  have  a  list  with  hundreds  [of]  other  mosques  to  be
destroyed for the same pretext’.10 ‘The last thing the West would do is to protest against
this  demolition’,  the minister of  Foreign Affairs  adds.  But on its  side,  The Hindu,  the
influential  daily  newspaper  of  South  India,  blamed the  United  States  for  its  lack  of
concern about the fate of the statues of Bamiyan. The United States has other interests,
The Hindu says, in connection with the oil and gas resources in this part of the world:
‘Who cares for Buddha images except for a minute population of Buddhists, a handful of
archaeologists, historians, art historians around the world, and the very few who bore a
love for the artistic creations of mankind over the centuries?’.11
These opposite reactions demonstrate that a distinction has to be made between those
who belong to the category of victim and those who belong to the outraged community:
the elimination of the Buddhist images is, for the Buddhist community, an outrage while
for the Taliban, the alleged lack of concern and assistance for the Afghans strengthens
their position of victims. The first category is related to a material loss or damage, as well
as to a moral harm that can be temporary or enduring. Hostility or discrimination, or
The Controversy over the Buddhas of Bamiyan
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
6
both, are linked to the condition of victim. The second category is more concerned with a
symbolic offence, with a sudden attack against the honour, the beliefs or the dignity of a
person or of a group.
To be a victim is often a durable state that brings about socio-economical and political
demand and implies a long-term strategy. Victims have a claim on those they consider
responsible for their situation. Outrage can, on the other hand, arouse an immediate
reaction;  outraged  persons  or  community  feel  forced  to  wash  it  away,  just  as  it  is
necessary to purify what has been soiled.
This does not mean that victims, or supposed so, cannot also feel outraged as well: the
contrast between the alleged indifference for the Afghan’s plight and the sole concern for
works  of  art  was  perceived  as  an  outrage  by  the  Taliban.  Moreover,  outraged
communities feel victims of social or political discrimination; and victimized population
are especially sensitive to outrage. So, surely, both notions are related. Yet again, the
posture of the Taliban as an outraged community could be, in turn, reversed. Sheikh
Yussuf Al-Qaradhaui, an authority on lawfulness and unlawfulness in Islamic law, warned
for instance that ‘by considering themselves more knowledgeable and more pious than
the  companions  of  the  Prophet  and  the  ‘well-guided  Caliphs’  [the  first  four  caliphs
according  to  the  Sunnis]  who  all  respected  historical  relics,  the  Taliban  were
demonstrating impious pride’ (AID 2001). The outrage, or at least the offence, did change
side once more.
 
The Hazaras, and the women of Afghanistan
The very location of the ‘outrage’—the valley of Bamiyan and its inhabitants, the Hazaras
—is to be considered now. After the Communist regime collapsed in 1992, the Hazarajat,
the  central  mountainous  region  of  Afghanistan  of  which  Bamiyan is  the  main  town
secured a quasi-autonomous status under the leadership of the Hezb-e Wahdat, the Party
of the Unity. Bamiyan became the provincial capital of what some Hazara nationalists
now call the Hazaristan—the country of the Hazaras—, a name based on the ethnic myth
of  a  homogenous  Hazara  and shia  community,  distinct  from the Afghanistan’s  other
populations. Though they did not claim a total independence from Kabul,  the Hazara
leaders  and the Hezb-e Wahdat  set  up in Bamiyan a  government  akin to  that  of  an
autonomous state with ministers, a parliament and an army.
Since the Islamic conquest, the site of Bamiyan, with its caves and gigantic figures, was
hardly used, if not, for the former, as shelters and warehouses and, for the latter, as a
reminder of idolatrous times and of idols that had been the target of past conquerors. But
after 1992, and for the first time, the site and the monuments were endowed with an
emblematic significance for the people of  Hazarajat.  For the Hazara intellectuals,  the
giant figures represented the ancestors of the indigenous population. They maintained
that is was not accidental if the Sunni conquerors went so fiercely against their faces. In
their view, the Taliban, who as Sunni and as Pashtuns are perceived as doubly hostile
towards the Hazaras, could not admit this autochthonous symbol, this source of Hazara
legitimacy.  According to the Hazara intellectuals,  this  is  one of  the reasons why the
Taliban having taken control of the Valley of Bamiyan targeted the Buddha figures. In the
opinion of  the Hazara elite,  the destruction of  the statues represented,  therefore,  an
insult  against  their  cultural  heritage,  against  their  dignity  and  against  the  Hazara
identity.
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Let us now consider another aspect of the outrage. Soon after the Mullah’s decree has
been carried out, the Western press published cartoons showing the Buddhas as female
silhouettes wearing a châdri, an obvious allusion to the Afghan women’s condition, given
that  the  giant  figures  had  no  face.  The  idea  that  the  two  Buddhas  are  sexually
differentiated  actually  exists  in  the  Afghan  tradition.  The  19th century  European
travellers had already noticed that for the local population one of the two statues had
female attributes. The inhabitants of Bamiyan indeed affirmed that the Buddhas form a
couple; the taller represents the man and the ‘smaller’ the woman, sometimes named Lât
and Manât, idols that, according to the Koran, Muhammad had been ordered to destroy.
As a matter of fact, the ‘little’ Buddha, supposedly the female companion, had already
been seriously damaged before February 2001: its head had been pulverised and a rocket
fire had caused a bid hole in the lower part of the body.
It was therefore tempting to conclude that, in addition to the destruction of an idol, the
Taliban wanted to mark with infamy the offending, and public, presence of a ‘female’
monument; as if not only the idol, but also its allegedly female component had to be
neutralised. According to this ‘gender’-oriented reading of the events, the fury directed
against one of the Buddhas was, metaphorically, aimed at the Afghan women; it was their
exclusion from the public domain and their pitiful lot during the Taliban regime that the
destruction of the statues symbolically emphasized. At least from a Western point of
view, Afghan women had to feel targeted and repressed in their desire of liberation.
‘Shame to the West’ uttered, on one side, the Taliban. ‘The act committed by the Taliban
is not Islamic’ said, on the other side, a group of Muslim intellectuals in a statement
published  in  the  French daily  Le  Monde.12 Does  this  reciprocity  in  the  attribution  of
offences  means  that  they  are  equivalent?  Ignorance  of  the  other  and  accusation  of
barbarism on both sides, concludes Goody in the last chapter of Islam in Europe (2004). In
reality,  the  British  anthropologist  dismisses  iconoclasm  of  all  monotheisms,  of  all
fanaticism  in  time  and  space.  In  Frei’s  film  as  well,  Mullah  Omar’s  decree  and  its
consequences  are  similarly downplayed:  offenders  and  offended  are  exchangeable
positions,  iconoclasm is  reduced to an opinion or a simple episode in the history of
religious movements. But how valid is this relativist approach?
Yet, at the grass-root level, those who are specifically targeted or who think they are,
clearly  identified  themselves  as  an  outraged  group  changing  from  an  imagined
community to a produced and concrete one. They can feel an acute awareness of their
common  condition  and  they  can  react  through  calculated  political  strategies.  This
awareness leads to a new definition of the Self—the member of an offended community—
and of the Other—the offender against whom the targeted community can be mobilised
into public actions. In the case of Afghanistan, such a process happened when the Hazaras
suddenly  appeared  as  explicit  actors  in  Afghan  politics  and,  possibly,  when  Afghan
women started to assert themselves as actors of the country’s social life,  though still
timidly and still  submitted to numerous constraints.  The claim for rights and justice,
which follow an ‘outrage’, as well as the condemnation of their dominated status can lead
excluded groups to new forms of political assertion.
It  thus appears  that  several  human groups were affected by the Taliban’s  iconoclast
action—an action that they perceived as an attack against their beliefs and an offence to
their dignity. But in the Taliban’s view, the offence was precisely these very reactions to
their action while the destruction of the statues had been nothing else than the result of,
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or a tentative to erase, previous outrages. Both manipulated the issue of the Buddhas’
destruction, with political aims in view: specific communities as much as Taliban.
 
Cultural heritage or secular cult?
In the West,  the destruction of  the Buddhas of  Bamiyan has  been condemned as  an
intolerable  attack against  the world heritage of  humanity.  ‘The Buddhas  of  Bamiyan
represented an unequalled cultural  richness’,  asserts  Pierre Cambon (2001:  25).  Their
destruction  has  not  just  affected  particular  ‘offended  communities’  or  ‘a  handful  of
archaeologists and art historians’, as The Hindu wrote a bit too quickly. It is the whole of
humanity that now mourns for one of its more precious treasures.
The making of  the Afghan national  heritage,  with the Buddhas as  its  jewel,13 passed
through different stages that I shall briefly address now. It is intimately related to the
European venture. The first European travellers, who in the 19th century, mentioned the
gigantic figures in their travelogues, were for the most part secret agents, explorers and
traffickers. The Buddhas they contemplate had no face: had they already been victims of
Muslim iconoclasm? Or were the faces missing since the very building of the statues,
replaced with gigantic masks that could be changed depending on the occasions? This is
not known. In 1832, Alexander Burnes, an agent of the Indian Political Service, described
the ‘couple of idols’ as relics of a past cult. He found them inelegant, even unsightly, good
only for savages and their primitive beliefs (1835: 159-160).
Charles Masson, while visiting the site in 1835, was the first to recognise the effigy of the
Buddha in the figures. He was also the first to admire them. He wrote: ‘The traveller
surveying (…) the vast and mysterious idols, and the multitude of caves around him, will
scarcely  fail  to  be  absorbed  in  deep  reflection  and  wonder…’  (Masson  1842:  392-3).
Wonder and meditation will be, from now on, the dominating feelings of the Western
scholars, travellers and tourists. In the 1920s, Maurice Fouchet, ministre plénipotentiaire
of  France  to  King  Amanullah,  wrote:  ‘The  Buddhas  of  Bamiyan  are  the  only  visible
richness of Afghanistan’, and he added: ‘The monk philosopher, disciple of Buddha, has
run away from the fanatic mullah, but the sublime stone figures still stand, arisen from
faith  into  a  superior  and  unknowable  world,  beyond  the  armful  ignorance  and  the
deceptive desire. Nothing, till now, could destroy these gigantic works…’ (Fouchet 1931:
125-6). From the first travellers to the archaeologists, from these to the hippies of the
1970s Great Tour, all  of them, or nearly all,  shared the same admiration for the site.
Eventually, in the 1980s, UNESCO chose the site of Bamiyan to be registered in its World
Cultural Heritage’s list but, because of the conflict, the registration was never officially
done.
What  about  the  Afghans?  What  was  their  feeling  about  the  ‘jewel’  of  their  cultural
heritage, this Western invention? It is difficult to know what the Buddhas meant to them.
In its entry ‘Bamiyân’, the Qâmus-e joghrafiyâ (the geographical dictionary of Afghanistan)
praised more the climate of the valley and the quality of its agricultural products than the
beauties of the cliff where the Buddhas used to stand. As a matter of fact, the inhabitants
of the valley used the caves to store their crop, or even as habitations. The smoke of the
fireplaces had covered and damaged the frescoes located within the sanctuaries and the
caves hewn in to the rock. During the recent conflict,  the cavities were even used as
munitions dump.
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It also has to be added that in the Muslim world, Buddha is called but, a word applied to
any idol  as  well.  Thus,  for  many Afghans,  the two giant  figures  were similar  to  the
monstrous  idols  mentioned in the Koran.  This  being said,  the inhabitants  of  Central
Afghanistan looked at the Buddhas as familiar presence and, in their religious beliefs, as
survivors of the pre-Islamic time, whose pagan origins were occasionally recalled by the
local  mullahs.  For  contemporary  travellers,  the  Buddhas  of  Bamiyan  were  no  more
‘active’: they were not objects of veneration for Buddhist pilgrims anymore and the cliff
did  not  shelter  monks  either.  Religious  objects  previously,  they  were  now  cultural
monuments, a testimony of the past. Yet, in the Taliban’s view, the two Buddhas still
belonged to the category of the sacred and were perceived as object of an idolatrous
veneration. Were they really wrong?
In the article published in Notre histoire, Paul Bernard (2001: 12) observes that ‘Art in the
West has become the guardian of the value of the sacred, till now allotted to our declining
religions […] The Louvre has replaced Notre Dame.’ And he goes on: ‘We really feel that
the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan is a profanation and a sacrilege, and not only
an attack against a masterpiece of Art’ (2001: 13). Truly, the defenders of the cultural
heritage, the UNESCO and the whole of the enlightened opinion had substituted a religion
for another: they were not only offended in their veneration for Art but also, and as such,
victims of a sacrilege.
In their effort  to portray the cultural  heritage’s  preservation as a human,  terrestrial
universal and secular value,  the protestors against the destruction of the Buddhas of
Bamiyan,  turned it  into a new transcendence;  into what Frodon calls  a non-religious
relationship with the invisible (2002: 221) and therefore usurping, for the Taliban, what
belongs to God. The indignation provoked by the destruction of a work that the West
‘sacralises’, as a cultural heritage of the humanity, is precisely what led the Taliban to
believe  that,  for  the  West,  another  type  of  idolatry—the  cult  of  Works  of  Art—has
replaced the false gods of Bamiyan. 
This  sheds  light  on  their  complete  misunderstanding  of  the  plea  presented  by  the
Western defenders of the Buddhas: the category ‘cultural heritage’ hardly existed for the
Taliban  or  was,  at  the  best,  suspicious.  More  vehement  was  the  protest  and  more
convinced  were  they  that  it  only  reflected  a  belief  as  illegitimate  as  that  of  idols
worshippers. The Taliban’s position precisely revealed their negation that a space for
secular  veneration  could  exist,  wherein  Art  would  have  replaced  the  God  of  the
monotheists. To worship a treasure that humanity, under numerous forms, has made and
accumulated in the course of centuries could only arouse their distrust and antagonize
them further.
While some were still struggling to come to term with the fact that they were loosing a
valued cultural heritage, a much more extended feeling of offence was in the making. It is
‘a  slap  for  the  whole  humanity,  for  the  very  idea  of  humanity’  claimed  the  French
newspaper Libération,14 extending the outrage to an infinity. It is ‘a sacrilege for humanity’
declared the Indian minister of Foreign Affairs Jaswant Singh, adding to the outrage done
to the cultural heritage the dimension of a desecration. The notion of sacrilege, and of the
sacred, which was at the centre of the offence done to the Buddhists, was interestingly
also a central component of the emotion felt much beyond the religious communities.
The modern agnostics, in love with works of Art and believers in the cultural heritage of
humanity, perceived themselves as the real outraged ones, even more so than the Asian
Buddhists.
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 Conclusion: Beyond the cultural heritage
Though  an  insufficient  sacrifice  because  it  came  too  late  in  their  view,  the  Taliban
ordered the destruction of the statues of Bamiyan so as to purify Afghanistan from an
age-old offence. Yet, in doing so, they were also striking a blow at other convictions and
their astounding act of iconoclasm led to the spiral of outrages: the offences were all
linked together, they somehow answered to each other in time and space. This ‘sacrifice’
provoked  other  reactions  emanating  from  those  who  considered  this  ‘purification’
nothing  but  a  sacrilege,  a  sacrilege  that  ‘has  transcended  the  boundaries  between
nationalities  and  religions’,  as  written  in  the  International  Herald  Tribune.15 And
progressively, the circle of the outraged people has considerably widened following the
mobilisation of public opinion.
Would have it  been conceivable  to  take reprisals  against  an attack on Art?  One can
admittedly  makes  politics  with  images,  as  Frodon  asserts  (2002),  one  could  have
threatened the Taliban with possible retaliatory destructions affecting fellow Muslims
elsewhere, for instance. In a mail addressed to the Refugee Council online16 the 2nd March
2001, Afghan scholars in UK suggested to mobilise Muslim minorities living in Buddhist
countries against the decree: these minorities ‘could appeal to Mullah Omar, arguing that
this action could potentially endanger them and their relationship with Buddhists, for
instance.’ ‘Works of art reject violence even for self-protection’, Paul Bernard says in a
rather angelic way, but ‘At the same time, they ardently oblige us not to forget for them
human  misfortune’,  he  adds  (2001:13).  Still,  the  outraged  ones  soon  became  also
‘outrageurs’: the mosque that supplanted the temple was destroyed in turn.17
The world-wide mobilisation against the Buddhas’ destruction did not cause the foreign
intervention in Autumn 2001, nor the collapse of the Taliban regime. Nevertheless, the
Taliban’s iconoclasm surely contributed to deligitimate their regime. The results of this
process are difficult to measure, but it was indubitably efficient: it excluded from the
realm of the ‘civilised’ humanity those who had dared to attack its ‘imaginary museum’.18 
The process has been all the more effective that it did not rely on any particular religious
or national community but on supposedly universal values.
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NOTES
1. The author would like to thank Amélie Blom for her careful and pertinent rereading of the
text.
2. My translation, as well as the translations of other French author’s quotations.
3. According to the tradition, Erostrate set fire to the Temple at Ephesus ‘to immortalise his
name’!
4. Sheikh Najm ud Din, called Hadda Mullah, was an influent ‘frontier mullah’ who resisted the
Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) and fought fiercely the British, most famously in the
Battle of Malakand (1897), which Churchill chronicled. The Hadda Mullah eventually died in 1903.
His  disciples continued to spread his  influence and established numerous madrasa in eastern
Afghanistan and in the North West Frontier Province (Pakistan), see also Basharat Peer (2008). 
5. Associated Press. 2001. 2 March.
6. Which is far from the truth!
7. Associated Press. 2001. 26 February.
8. I thank Nicolas Jaoul, CNRS, for having put this work at my disposal.
9. The Sunday Nation. 2001. 4 March, A6.
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10. In the Times of India, Jyotirmaya Sharma puts on the same lines Mullah Omar and the Hindu
extremist Kishore. ‘For every Mulla Mohammad Omar in Afghanistan, there is a corresponding
Giriraj  Kishore.  Similarly,  for every felling of  the Bamiyan Buddha,  there is  a  parallel  in the
destruction of the Babri Masjid in India.’ (Ahir 2001: 63).
11. The Hindu (Delhi edition). 2001. 16 March.
12. 9 March, 2001.
13. The ‘big’  one has ‘precious radiant ornaments’  and his ‘golden complexion is bright’,  the
‘small’ one is covered with brilliant metallic plates: this is how the Chinese pilgrim Hiuan Tsang,
the main authority on Bamiyan during the Buddhist period, described the two giant Buddhas in
the 7th century. Hiuan Tsang stayed in the high valley, on his way to India, in search for canonical
Buddhist manuscripts in 632 AC—incidentally the year of Muhammad’s death also.
14. 2 March, 2001.
15. 2 April, 2001.
16. http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/ accessed March 2001.
17. The  Babri  Mosque  in  Ayodha  was  supposedly  built  by  order  of  Babur,  the  first  Mughal
Emperor, on the birthplace of the deity Rama.
18. ‘Of course, all civilised people must decry and discredit the Taliban syndrome beyond our
borders’ (Ahir 2001: 76).
ABSTRACTS
The author analyses a rare case of mirror-outrage that followed the destruction of the Buddhas
of Bamiyan. This event brought the Taliban and the international community into opposition in
2001. The article first stresses the intriguing paradigmatic similarities between the destruction of
the  Buddhas  and  the  destruction  of  Artemis  Temple  in  356  BC,  when  the  eradication  of  a
monument,  sacred as well  as emblematic of a cultural heritage,  was perceived as an outrage
against piety and beauty. This analogy helps the author emphasize the uncertainty regarding the
identification  of  the  victims:  were  they  ‘the  people’  in  general,  abstract  deities,  or  specific
communities? The article then elaborates on the argumentation and self-justification presented
by the Taliban, and underlies their sense of indignation at a protest coming from ‘Christian’
countries, which they saw as exclusively concerned with saving ‘idols’ but ignorant of the ordeal
endured  by  the  Afghans.  It  finally  argues  that  conflicting  visions  over  the  very  meaning  of
‘cultural heritage’ were at the core of the controversy.
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